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Case Note 
RELIABILITY AND RELEVANCE AS THE TOUCHSTONES 
FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS 
Muhammad bin Kadar v PP 
[2011] 3 SLR 1205 
The Court of Appeal in Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] 
3 SLR 1205 (“Kadar”) formally recognised the judicial 
discretion to exclude evidence as an integral part of the law 
on criminal evidence in Singapore. This discretion, the court 
held, would help ensure that all evidence coming before the 
court would be as reliable as possible. While this commentary 
agrees that the foundational basis for the exclusionary 
discretion doctrine is desirable, it suggests that there are 
difficulties with the application of the doctrine. An alternative 
approach that works around the difficulties is canvassed for 
consideration. 
CHEN Siyuan 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard); 
Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. 
Nicholas POON 
LLB (summa) (Singapore Management University);  
Practice Trainee, Rajah & Tann LLP (at the time of writing). 
I. Introduction 
1 Two brothers, Muhammad and Ismil, were alleged to have 
robbed and murdered a woman in her own flat and in the presence of 
her bedridden husband. Because of the constantly changing testimonies, 
much of the trial and appeal centred on determining who was at the 
crime scene and who had committed the robbery-murder. Several 
statements were made to the police after the brothers were arrested, but 
it suffices for present purposes to focus on the first two statements made 
by Ismil. His first statement was made to SSI Zainal (who had 30 years 
of investigative experience) in a police car near the crime scene, after  
SSI Zainal had told the police officers accompanying Ismil to leave  
them alone. Despite initially denying knowledge of the offence, Ismil 
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confessed to having “slash[ed]” a female the day before.1 Although there 
were other colleagues around who had field diaries, this statement was 
recorded on a piece of paper, and only recorded in SSI Zainal’s field 
diary after lunch. Notably, a different word, “stabbed”, was used.2 Ismil 
gave his second statement at a police centre. He said that he had gone to 
the deceased’s flat to borrow money and he had taken a knife from her 
flat; he also said he saw an old man lying on a bed in the flat, and that he 
had acted alone in the crime. SSI Zainal recorded this in his field diary 
also only after lunch. No warning was administered to Ismil before both 
statements were recorded, and both statements were neither read back 
to Ismil nor signed by him. 
2 The Court of Appeal held that given the circumstances in which 
both statements were obtained, the basic procedural requirements 
found in the Criminal Procedure Code3 (“CPC”) and Police General 
Orders had been contravened. The court further said that both statements 
seemed to have been “obtained in deliberate non-compliance with the 
procedural requirements … rather than mere carelessness or operational 
necessity”,4 and went on to declare:5 
[T]he breaches of s 121 of the CPC and the Police General Orders are 
serious enough to compromise in a material way the reliability of the 
[two statements] … it is not apparent to us that the probative value of 
the two statements can be said to exceed the prejudicial effect of the 
statements against their maker. It could, perhaps, be said that this is 
more so in respect to the police car statement … SSI Zainal admitted 
that he was aware that a slash is different from a stab … 
[W]e find that both statements should have been found inadmissible 
under the exclusionary discretion. The burden was on the Prosecution 
to convince the court that the probative value of each of the two 
statements, which had been compromised by the manifest irregularities 
that took place when each of them was supposedly recorded, was 
higher than their prejudicial effect. As breaches of the CPC and the 
Police General Orders also appeared to be deliberate, the explanation 
given needed to be especially cogent … 
[emphasis added] 
3 This declaration was prefaced by the following passages:6 
[T]here is no reason why a discretion to exclude voluntary statements 
from accused persons should not exist where the prejudicial effect of 
																																																																										
1 Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [15]. 
2 Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [15]–[16]. 
3 (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) s 121. 
4 Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [140]. 
5 Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [146]–[147]. 
6 Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [55]–[60]. 
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the evidence exceeds its probative value … the very reliability of the 
statement sought to be admitted is questionable ... this is an area of 
judicial discretion that Parliament has left to the courts … Probative 
value is … the crucial factor vis-à-vis admissibility or non-admissibility 
of statements from accused persons under the CPC. This is already the 
settled position under the [Evidence Act] … 
[P]rocedural irregularities may be a cause for a finding that a 
statement’s prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value … the 
rules … for the recording of statements are … to provide a safeguard 
as to reliability. The same can be said in respect to the Police General 
Orders … 
… in Singapore, the law provides police officers with great freedom 
and latitude to exercise their comprehensive and potent powers of 
interrogation in the course of investigations. This means that the 
evidential reliability of any written statements taken from accused 
persons rests greatly on the conscientiousness [of the police 
officers] … 
[W]ritten statements taken by the police are often given more weight 
by finders of fact as compared to most other kinds of evidence. This  
is because formal statements taken by the police have the aura of 
reliability … 
… All that is required for a miscarriage of justice to occur is for [a] 
police officer to record [a] statement with embellishments … 
Alternatively, a police officer may be indolent … 
Police investigators are aware when they record statements that they 
are likely to be tendered as evidence before a court and there is 
therefore an uncompromising need for accuracy and reliability …  
a court should take a firm approach in considering its exercise of the 
exclusionary discretion in relation to statements recorded by the police 
in violation of the relevant requirements of the CPC and the Police 
General Orders … 
[emphasis in original] 
II. Commentary 
A. Overview of our analysis 
4 The overarching theme of this piece thus pertains to identifying 
and conceptualising the touchstones for the admissibility of procedurally 
irregular evidence (such as the statements in Kadar), and more 
broadly, touchstones for the admissibility of all evidence in criminal 
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proceedings.7 With regard to the former, it is a trite principle that 
procedurally irregular evidence is admissible, although less weight may 
be attached if necessary.8 While Kadar reaffirmed this general rule,9 it 
emphasised that the court also has the discretion to exclude procedurally 
irregular evidence that would otherwise be admissible if the prejudicial 
effect of the evidence outweighs the probative value. This is known as 
the exclusionary discretion doctrine. Although this doctrine is of some 
pedigree in the common law,10 it has been plagued with numerous 
intractable problems and, as will be submitted, should be approached 
with caution. For instance, not long after Kadar was decided, it was 
pointed out that:11 
References to the weighing of probative value and prejudicial 
effect/prejudice, while perhaps conventional in local discourses of 
Evidence Law, are always problematic. What exactly do these two 
terms mean? Certainly, there have been attempts at illustrations and 
definitions, but even assuming these attempts are accepted, at least 
three further questions arise: do they have a consistent application in 
all the different exclusionary rules found in the [various statutes];  
how exactly does one balance the two; and how do they relate to  
the contiguous concepts of relevance (legal and logical), weight, 
admissibility, and the like? 
5 This commentary attempts to address the foundational issues 
behind the exclusionary discretion doctrines and makes the following 
conclusions: 
(a) First, the doctrine’s test of balancing probative value 
and prejudicial effect (the “balancing test”) remains unclear as 
to definition and operation.12 
(b) Second, cases have thus far avoided thorough discussions 
on the fundamental basis/rationale of the doctrine,13 resulting  
																																																																										
7 It has been argued, for the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) at least, that our 
law on evidence lacks a “coherent value system”: Chin Tet Yeung, “Remaking the 
Evidence Code” (2009) 21 SAcLJ 52 at 52. 
8 See, for example, Vasavan Sathiadew v PP [1992] SGCA 26. 
9 Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [44]. 
10 Muhammad bin Kadar v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [53]. 
11 Chen Siyuan, “Dealing with Unreliable Evidence” SLW Commentary, Issue 1, 
August 2011 at 4. 
12 See paras 7–11 below. 
13 Mark Gelowitz, “Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Middle 
Ground or No Man’s Land” (1990) 106 LQR 327; Katherine Grevling, “Fairness 
and the Exclusion of Evidence under Section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act” (1997) 113 LQR 667. However, see Richard May, “Fair Play at Trial: 
An Interim Assessment of Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984” [1988] Crim LR 722 at 726. 
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in the lack of a coherent theory to sustain its continued 
invocation.14 
(c) Third, the exclusionary discretion doctrine should be 
avoided in our jurisprudence from henceforth. The very existence 
of this doctrine had, in fact, been coloured with some doubt,15 
following the seminal case of Law Society of Singapore v Tan 
Guat Neo Phyllis16 (“Phyllis”). 
(d) Fourth, notwithstanding the difficulties with the 
exclusionary discretion doctrine, Kadar establishes, albeit 
implicitly, imperative foundations toward recognising a sounder 
and more concrete approach of reliability and relevance as  
the touchstones for admissibility of all evidence in criminal 
proceedings.17 Such an approach is consistent with the 
provisions, principles, and purposes of the Evidence Act18 and 
Criminal Procedure Code 201019 (“CPC 2010”), to which all 
evidence in criminal proceedings must pass muster. 
6 Before proceeding, it is noted that although Kadar did not 
express a view on the application of the doctrine beyond statements to 
the police, the doctrine is unlikely to be (nor intended to be) so narrow 
in scope. This is because Kadar affirmed R v Sang20 (“Sang”), in which 
the House of Lords had explicitly acknowledged the existence of a 
general discretion to exclude evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighs 
its probative value.21 Although each Law Lord in Sang described the 
exclusionary discretion in their own terms, all of them regarded  
this discretion as being general and not confined to any particular 
exclusionary rule of evidence.22 This aspect of Sang was subsequently 
adopted in inter alia, Phyllis.23 In so far as Kadar cited Sang and Phyllis in 
support of the exclusionary discretion doctrine, it can be safely inferred 
that the court can exercise its exclusionary discretion vis-à-vis the 
admissibility of all evidence in criminal proceedings.24 
																																																																										
14 See paras 12–16 below. 
15 Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2010)  
at para 10.01. 
16 [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239. See also Lee Chez Kee v PP [2008] 3 SLR(R) 447 at [106]. 
17 See Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2010) 
at paras 10.01–10.02. 
18 Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed. 
19 Act 15 of 2010. 
20 [1980] 1 AC 402. 
21 R v Sang [1980] 1 AC 402 at 437–438, 447. See also Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence and the 
Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2010) at para 10.22. 
22 R v Sang [1980] 1 AC 402 at 452. 
23 Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [127]. 
24 See also PP v Mas Swan bin Adnan [2011] SGHC 107 at [104]. 
 
540 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2012) 24 SAcLJ 
	
B. Problems with the balancing test 
7 Although the balancing test as currently formulated has been 
around for decades, few attempts have been made to properly delineate 
the scope and operation of this test.25 Looking at the extracts of the 
decision above,26 Kadar is, with respect, guilty of this as well. One may 
argue that probative value is quite easily understood or less contentious,27 
but the same cannot be said for prejudicial effect. There is more than 
some trifling doubt as to what prejudice really means. Zuckerman 
argues that prejudice must mean something other than an inference 
which is unfavourable to the accused; anything less would mean any 
evidence of guilt will “never be admissible”.28 Zuckerman could not have 
meant that any evidence indicating guilt would never be admissible.29 
What Zuckerman might have meant was that any evidence that has 
some probative value would also necessarily be prejudicial. Thus, for the 
evidence to have more prejudicial effect than probative value, something 
more than evidence of guilt is required. A possible comprehension of  
the balancing test is to conceive it as protecting against a “logically 
unwarranted inference of guilt”.30 In other words, the test is a balance 
between the probative weight of a piece of evidence and the risk that the 
judge or jury would arrive at an unwarranted inference of guilt. Ergo,  
a highly prejudicial piece of evidence is one that has a high propensity to 
influence the mind of a fact-finder into making an inference of guilt 
which he would not have made if he had not factored in the tainted 
evidence. 
8 One wonders, however, if prejudice and probative value are 
actually two sides of the same coin in so far as both concepts provide the 
same outcome independently. The probative value of a piece of evidence 
is, theoretically, objectively ascertainable and independent of the 
idiosyncrasies of the fact-finders.31 This must be so if the truth of a fact 
is absolute. Every fact-finder’s evaluation of the probative value of a 
																																																																										
25 See generally Chen Siyuan, “Revisiting the Similar Fact Rule in Singapore” [2011] 
Sing JLS 553. 
26 See paras 1–3 above. 
27 However, see Robert Margolis, “The Concept of Relevance: In the Evidence Act 
and the Modern View” (1990) 11 Sing LR 24 at 32 (“The Concept of Relevance”). 
See also Law Reform Committee, Singapore Academy of Law, Report of the Law 
Reform Committee on Opinion Evidence (October 2011) at 7. 
28 Adrian Zuckerman, “Similar Fact Evidence – The Unobservable Rule” (1987) 
104 LQR 187 at 194. See also Ho Hock Lai, “An Introduction to Similar Fact 
Evidence”(1998) 19 Sing LR 166 at 167. 
29 See, for example, PP v Mas Swan bin Adnan [2011] SGHC 107. 
30 Adrian Zuckerman, “Similar Fact Evidence – The Unobservable Rule” (1987) 
104 LQR 187 at 194. 
31 P B Carter, “Forbidden Reasoning Permissible: Similar Fact Evidence a Decade 
After Boardman” (1985) 48 MLR 29 at 36. 
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particular piece of evidence should thus be roughly identical. If 
probative value is then taken to mean the likelihood of inferring guilt, 
whilst prejudice refers to the degree of risk that an unwarranted 
inference of guilt may result from the admission of the evidence, the 
probative strength of the evidence should correlate positively to the 
degree of prejudice. A piece of evidence that is unlikely to give rise to a 
strong inference of guilt will have an equally limited prejudicial effect 
even if admitted; that must be so if one assumes fact-finders to be 
logical. Conversely, evidence with high probative value increases the risk 
of an unwarranted inference of guilt if the evidence is admitted.32  
One might question why the inference of guilt is unwarranted if the 
probative value is high. The use of “unwarranted” in this context is a 
description of the likely consequential finding of guilt which would not 
have been made but for the admission of the evidence. Obviously, if the 
evidence is probative and admissible in the first place, then there is 
arguably no “unwarranted” inference of guilt; the accused is guilty as 
charged. The controversy only arises when the evidence is probative but 
there are doubts about its prima facie admissibility. Given this positive 
correlation between probative and prejudicial, there is, in theory, no 
need to balance prejudice and probative value. 
9 The reality, however, is that the same piece of evidence can be 
perceived as having both low and high probative value by different 
people at the same time.33 This inability to accord an objective and 
immutable probative value to a piece of evidence causes varying  
and unwarranted levels of prejudice.34 As such, when evidence that 
should logically be given low probative value is mistakenly perceived as  
having high probative value, prejudice in the form of the risk of an 
unwarranted inference of guilt becomes more significant than it should 
be if the proper probative value was given. To illustrate, evidence of an 
accused’s criminal past is generally excluded35 because it may “invoke the 
[inescapably] deep tendency of human nature to punish”.36 Yet, this 
																																																																										
32 See McGovern v HM Advocate [1950] SLT 133 at 135, where it was “obvious” to 
Lord Cooper that because the evidence was strong, admission of that evidence “must 
to a substantial extent have prejudiced the appellants in the minds of the jury”. 
33 See generally David Kaye & Jonathan Koehler, “The Misquantification of Probative 
Value” (2003) 27(6) Law and Human Behavior 645.
 
34 Thomas Gibbons & Allan Hutchinson, “The Practice and Theory of Evidence Law” 
(1982) 2 International Rev of Law and Economics 119 at 123. However, the position 
in Singapore is that judges are more competent than jurors to deal with prejudicial 
evidence and hence can assess all evidence objectively: see, for example, Wong Kim 
Poh v PP [1992] 1 SLR(R) 13 at [14] and Tan Chee Kieng v PP [1994] 2 SLR(R) 577 
at [8]. 
35 Tan Meng Jee v PP [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [48]. 
36 Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law (Tillers, 1983) at 1185. See also 
Sally Lloyd-Bostock, “The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant’s 
Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study” (2000) Crim LR 734 at 753–755; 
Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie Hans, “Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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human tendency conflicts with numerous studies that have concluded 
that at least in respect of specific types of conduct, the belief that past 
behaviour is indicative of future misconduct is clearly false.37 Prejudice 
results because the trier of fact “attaches more weight to the evidence 
than it deserved”.38 This is perhaps what was meant in Boardman v 
Director of Public Prosecutions,39 when Lord Cross explained the substance 
of the similar fact rule as “not that the law regards such evidence as 
inherently irrelevant but because it is believed that if generally admitted, 
jurors would in many cases think that it was more relevant than it was … 
[such that] its prejudicial effect would outweigh its probative value” 
[emphasis in original].40 
10 The aforementioned discordance between theory and reality 
dovetails with the last but not the least of the criticisms of the balancing 
test: its operation. What does it mean to say that the prejudicial effect 
must be balanced with the probative value? As has been pointed out:41 
[I]f a piece of evidence has the attribute of ‘prejudice’, does it mean it 
has ‘a prejudicial influence on the minds [of the fact-finders] out of 
proportion to its true evidential value’, or that it simply has no 
relevance (and therefore no evidential value whatsoever), serving only 
to unfairly colour the minds of the fact-finders to the extent of causing 
injustice? 
It is this hitherto unresolved question that severely undermines the 
utility of the balancing test.42 In theory, as explained, evidence with high 
probative value will naturally result in greater prejudice. Under this 
view, there is nothing to balance and even if one attempts to balance, the 
probative value and prejudicial effect will simply negate each other. 
Likewise, under the approach that accounts for the reality of human 
behaviour, the balancing test is still incoherent. The reason is that 
prejudice only occurs when human behaviour results in undeserved 
																																																																																																																										
Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes” 
(2009) 94 Cornell LR 1353 at 1357, 1380–1385. 
37 See, for example, Deborah Davis & William Follette, “Rethinking the Probative Value 
of Evidence: Base Rates, Intuitive Profiling, and the ‘Postdiction’ of Behavior” 
(2002) 26 Law and Human Behavior 143; Thomas Lyon & Jonathan Koehler, “The 
Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Probative Value of Expert Testimony in Child 
Sexual Abuse Cases” (1996) 82 Cornell LR 43. 
38 Colin Tapper, Cross & Tapper on Evidence (Oxford University Press, 12th Ed, 2007) 
at p 423. 
39 [1974] 3 WLR 673. 
40 Boardman v Director of Public Prosecutions [1974] 3 WLR 673 at 702. 
41 Chen Siyuan, “Revisiting the Similar Fact Rule in Singapore” [2011] Sing JLS 553 
at 560. 
42 Colin Tapper, “The Law of Evidence and the Rule of Law” (2009) 68(1) CLJ 67 
at 72–73. 
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weight being attached to a piece of evidence.43 Yet, at the same time,  
one can only determine if weight is attributed undeservedly, ie, the 
prejudicial effect, after the probative value has been factored in. It 
cannot be said that there is undeserved emphasis placed on the evidence 
without reference to its probative value.44 Simply put, the balancing test 
is subsumed within the concept of prejudice and it is illogical to then 
balance this prejudice against the probative value of the evidence a 
second time.45 
11 Ultimately, the weighing of the prejudicial effect of a piece  
of evidence against its probative value is very much an exercise in 
abstraction.46 Such high generality may have been deliberate so as not to 
unnecessarily fetter judicial discretion,47 but the practical result is the 
inability to provide clear guidance to those subject to, or seeking to 
apply, the discretion in the first place.48 There may well be no solution to 
the difficulties inherent49 in the operation of the balancing test, but 
perhaps then it may be worth evaluating alternatives to the balancing 
test. 
C. Possible bases of the exclusionary discretion doctrine 
12 If the balancing test is to be replaced, regard must still be had to 
the fundamental basis for the exclusionary discretion doctrine. In this 
respect, it is noteworthy that there is still no single coherent theory  
that explains the fundamental basis for the exclusionary discretion 
doctrine.50 There are essentially three theories that have been posited, of 
which the first two will now be considered. 
13 The theory perhaps most widely accepted is fairness of trial.51  
It is necessary to revisit Sang to understand what this means since  
the exclusionary discretion doctrine recognised in Kadar is a direct 
descendant of Sang. Unfortunately, most of the Law Lords in Sang did 
not define “unfairness at trial”, and those who did gave rather circular 
propositions. Lord Diplock conceived a fair trial as necessarily excluding 
information likely to influence the mind of the fact-finder that is 
																																																																										
43 See generally Robert Margolis, “Evidence of Similar Facts, the Evidence Act, and 
the Judge of Law as Trier of Fact” (1988) 9 Sing LR 103 at 105. 
44 Colin Tapper, Cross & Tapper on Evidence (Oxford University Press, 12th Ed, 2007) 
at p 423. 
45 This was alluded to in Tan Meng Jee v PP [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [50]. 
46 See Antony Duff et al, The Trial on Trial vol 3 (Hart, 2007) at p 256. 
47 R v Samuel [1988] 2 WLR 920 at 934. 
48 Colin Tapper, “The Law of Evidence and the Rule of Law” (2009) 68(1) CLJ 67 at 71. 
49 Tan Meng Jee v PP [1996] 2 SLR(R) 178 at [51]. 
50 See generally Mary Hunter, “Judicial Discretion: Section 78 in Practice” [1994] 
Crim LR 558. 
51 See, eg, R v Sang [1980] 1 AC 402 at 455. 
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“prejudicial to the accused [and] which is out of proportion to the true 
probative value of that evidence”.52 This is, with respect, unhelpful, as 
has been demonstrated above.53 For Lord Scarman, there are three 
principles inherent in a fair trial: the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the inadmissibility of statements that were made involuntarily, and that 
“no man is to be convicted except upon the probative effect of legally 
admissible evidence”.54 Any evidence that endangers these principles 
compromises the accused’s right to a fair trial, and may thus be excluded 
by the judge exercising his discretion.55 In so far as fairness of trial is one 
suggested basis for the exclusionary discretion doctrine, Lord Scarman’s 
third principle is potentially relevant. However, again, it is unhelpful to 
state that a fair trial is only obtainable if the conviction is based upon 
the “probative effect of legally admissible evidence”. This necessarily 
ignores any consideration of prejudice – unless prejudice and probative 
are taken to be two sides of the same coin, which, as explained above, 
does not comport with the operation of the test in reality.56 
14 The need for a fair trial has also been discussed in other 
jurisprudence, and this deserves brief consideration. In R v Potvin,57  
the Supreme Court of Canada identified two different categories of 
unfairness: unfairness in the manner in which the evidence was obtained, 
and unfairness in the trial caused by admission of evidence fairly 
obtained. The majority, however, suggested that these two categories 
were “not as distinct” and unfairness in the manner in which evidence is 
obtained can have a significant effect on the fairness of the trial –  
the corollary then is that illegally obtained evidence may attract the 
exclusionary discretion doctrine.58 Judicial discretion to exclude otherwise 
admissible evidence continued to be regarded by subsequent cases59 as 
necessary for a fair trial, but there has not been any conclusive 
clarification on what the courts meant by a fair trial. Perhaps the best 
attempt at defining the concept of fair trial was by McLachlin J in R v 
Harrer,60 where she stated that a fair trial is neither the most 
advantageous trial for the accused nor the perfect trial; it is simply one 
which satisfies the public interest in getting at the truth while preserving 
basic procedural fairness to the accused.61 However, such expressions of 
fairness do not assist very much as they remain couched in a high level 
																																																																										
52 R v Sang [1980] 1 AC 402 at 436–437. 
53 See paras 7–11 above. 
54 R v Sang [1980] 1 AC 402 at 455. 
55 R v Sang [1980] 1 AC 402 at 455. 
56 See nn 42–49 above. 
57 (1989) 68 CR (3d) 193. 
58 R v Potvin (1989) 68 CR (3d) 193 at 237. 
59 R v White (1999) 24 CR (5th) 201; R v Harrer 101 CCC (3d) 193. 
60 R v Harrer 101 CCC (3d) 193. 
61 R v Harrer 101 CCC (3d) 193 at [45]; R v Smurthwaite [1994] 1 All ER 898  
at 902–903. 
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of abstraction. The penumbra meanings of what amounts to a fair trial 
should not be the decisive factor in hard cases. 
15 So where does Kadar feature in this scheme of things? First, the 
Court of Appeal cited with approval62 Pinsler’s proposition that the 
court’s discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence is based on 
the court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent injustice at trial.63 Second, it 
cautioned that “courts should refrain from excluding evidence based 
only on facts indicating unfairness in the way evidence was obtained (as 
opposed to unfairness in the sense of contributing to a wrong outcome at 
trial)” [emphasis in original].64 Third, Sang (followed in Kadar) suggests 
that the exclusionary discretion is “co-extensive” with the duty of the 
judge to ensure a fair trial.65 These three facts, when read together, may 
lead one to believe that the basis of the exclusionary discretion doctrine 
is the need for a fair trial. For reasons given below, this is not how Kadar 
should be interpreted.66 However, if Kadar is to be interpreted as 
adopting trial fairness as a basis for the test of admissibility, this basis 
must be limited to fairness that centres its attention on the outcome of 
the trial, and not fairness of the entire process of the trial (beginning 
with the investigations and ending with the verdict). This must be so 
given the prevailing position established by Phyllis that there is no 
judicial discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence save arguably  
in exceptional circumstances.67 Coupled with the court’s multiple 
references to “reliability” when justifying the exclusionary discretion 
doctrine (this will be explored soon), the better view may be to interpret 
the references to “fair trial” in Kadar as placing emphasis on ensuring a 
“right” conviction. In the end, the court is expected to, and indeed, does 
always strive to ensure that a conviction is “right”. An outcome may 
sometimes justify a principle, but in this case, to say that the exclusionary 
discretion doctrine is founded on the need to ensure that convictions 
are “right” is, with respect, not advancing very much. 
																																																																										
62 Muhammad Kadar v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [52]. 
63 Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 3rd Ed, 2010)  
at paras 10.20, 10.24. Pinsler also makes the point (at para 10.38) that the Evidence 
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16 The second theory commonly invoked to justify the exclusionary 
discretion doctrine is: the need to ensure minimum standards of law 
enforcement.68 This was, however, rejected by Kadar, and rightly so. 
Although the Court of Appeal expressed the hope that the potential 
exercise of the court’s exclusionary discretion may lead to law 
enforcement officers having less incentive to breach procedural 
safeguards, it was quick to emphasise that courts should be “careful to 
avoid basing the exercise of exclusionary discretion primarily on a desire 
to discipline the wrongful behaviour” of law enforcement officers, 
including the Prosecution.69 It may be said, of course, that the judiciary 
has a duty to keep law enforcement officers in check and prevent the 
courts from abetting or endorsing flagrant improprieties by the police, 
or to be perceived as indirect instruments of illegalities.70 However,  
this consideration cannot be turned on its head to justify a deliberate 
decision to acquit an accused even in the face of evidence with high 
probative value pointing towards guilt. It should not be assumed that 
law enforcement officers will be “punished” simply because a guilty 
person escapes conviction as a result of procedural impropriety on the 
part of the law enforcement officers. One should not lightly assume that 
law enforcement officers inevitably derive some satisfaction at obtaining 
a conviction of an accused; one should also not lightly assume that upon 
being informed that it is their non-compliance with procedural rules 
which resulted in the court’s decision to acquit an accused who would 
otherwise have been convicted, other law enforcement officers would 
suddenly strive to comply with procedural rules.71 At bottom, it does not 
stand to reason that a guilty person should get away scot-free and 
society-at-large should live with the danger the guilty person may pose 
to them, just to fulfil a hope that an acquittal would push law enforcement 
officers to achieve higher standards of procedural compliance.72 Indeed, 
there are many other ways, such as civil proceedings, prosecution of 
truly miscreant law enforcement officers,73 and internal disciplinary 
																																																																										
68 See, for example, Ian Dennis, The Law of Evidence (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 
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69 Muhammad Kadar v PP [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [68]. 
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71 Ian Dennis, The Law of Evidence (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2002) at p 86; 
William Twining, Rethinking Evidence (Northwestern University Press, 1994) 
at pp 363–364. 
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processes that are probably more appropriate in resolving any alleged 
improper conduct on the part of these officers. These alternatives may 
be more apt especially since most, if not all, procedural lapses are 
individual or anomalous rather than systemic.74 Even if it can be 
established that there is a systemic pattern of procedural impropriety, it 
is difficult to imagine the court’s role and effectiveness in neutralising 
this. Accordingly, except where expressly stipulated by statute,75 the court 
should not seek to exclude evidence simply because it thinks it is 
necessary to uphold minimum standards of law enforcement. Kadar’s 
confirmation that the law on criminal procedure and evidence is not the 
proper tool and the court not the appropriate platform to enforce 
disciplinary standards of police conduct is to be welcomed. However, 
this still leaves us without a sound foundational basis for the exclusionary 
discretion doctrine. 
D. The unifying touchstones of reliability and relevance 
17 It is now apposite to consider the third possible fundamental 
basis of the exclusionary discretion doctrine: reliability. A close reading 
of Kadar reveals that minimum standards of law enforcement and 
fairness of trial are not the predominant justifications for the doctrine.76 
Kadar, however, referred to reliability at least nine times in the course of 
justifying the exclusionary discretion doctrine.77 Most imperatively, it 
said that “[o]ur statutory rules of admissibility as governed by the CPC, 
the CPC 2010 and the [Evidence Act] impose a certain minimum 
standard of credibility and materiality” [emphasis added].78 That is, the 
touchstones of admissibility (of all evidence in criminal proceedings) are 
essentially reliability and relevance – no more, and no less. Kadar is 
probably the first case – albeit seemingly in the limited context of 
procedurally irregular statements – that categorically reconciles and 
articulates the unifying values underpinning the CPC (and CPC 2010), 
																																																																																																																										
73 This was suggested by the court in Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis 
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A General Survey of Risk Factors” (2010) 28 Sing LR 98. 
75 See, for example, s 24(2) of the Canadian Charter (1982). Section 24(2) is, however, 
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the Evidence Act,79 and our case law. As relevance is already an 
irrefutable touchstone for admissibility,80 it is necessary to test the 
robustness of Kadar’s proposition only with respect to reliability. 
18 Prefatorily, reliability as the foundation for admissibility of 
evidence is not entirely novel. Indeed, courts81 and commentators82 
routinely refer to reliability as a crucial consideration in admitting or 
excluding evidence. After some earlier misgivings, even the English 
courts are turning to reliability as the direct criterion of admissibility of 
criminal evidence in general.83 Reliability focuses the inquiry into  
the safeness of using the particular evidence in arriving at its verdict. 
This must be a foundational prerequisite in all criminal trials; the 
rightfulness of a conviction is heavily dependent on the reliability of the 
evidence that justifies the verdict. If ensuring that the right person is 
convicted is a fundamental objective of the criminal justice system, it 
follows that reliability must be a touchstone for the admissibility of 
evidence in criminal proceedings. Further advantages of this proposed 
approach will now be highlighted. 
19 First, the proposed approach is consistent with the rules in the 
CPC and CPC 2010 (that is, beyond just those governing the formal 
requirements of statements discussed in Kadar), as well as the spirit of 
those statutes. With regard to the rules, one of the representative 
illustrations is the established threshold of “inducement, threat or 
promise” that governs the voluntariness of an accused’s statements 
(to say, the police).84 This threshold is unquestionably premised on 
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[2010] 3 SLR 110 at [24]–[26]. 
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[1995] 2 SLR(R) 124 at [29]; PP v Huang Rong Tai [2003] 2 SLR(R) 43 at [27]–[35]. 
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David Schwartz, “A Foundation Theory of Evidence” (2011) 100 Georgetown LJ 95 
at 104. 
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reliability as the major consideration. Indeed, where an accused’s free 
will has been sapped to the point of causing him to make a statement he 
would not otherwise have made, the reliability of his statement is called 
into question and is deemed inadmissible.85 With regard to the spirit, 
although Singapore has traditionally been perceived to possess a general 
preference for the crime control model over the due process model, 
there is now a paradigm shift towards the latter in her conceptualisation 
of the criminal justice process.86 Notably, a key objective of the  
CPC 2010 is the establishment of truth (as opposed to exclusively 
pursuing the objective of securing a conviction).87 Truth and reliability 
are interdependent; truth can only be achieved if the premises or 
processes needed to establish the truth are reliable.88 Thus, acknowledging 
reliability as a touchstone for admissibility is consistent with the 
paradigm shift. As opined, “improvements to reliability transform the 
crime control and due process objects of convicting the guilty and 
acquitting the innocent into ‘two sides of the same coin’”.89 
20 Second, the proposed approach is consistent with the underlying 
rationales for the various so-called “exclusionary” rules in the Evidence 
Act.90 For instance, in the realm of hearsay,91 the requirement for the 
witness to testify to facts directly perceived is to guard against the 
“danger of unreliability”, while in the realm of opinion, the rule exists to 
guard against a witness’s “subjective reaction [that] may be unreliable” 
[emphasis added].92 To cite an even more appropriate example, using the 
test of relevance and reliability for the similar fact rule would remove 
any confusion over the operation of the balancing test that  
was adopted in Tan Meng Jee v PP93 (“Tan Meng Jee”). There, the 
Court of Appeal held that the balancing test was inherent within and 
accommodated by ss 14 and 15 of the Evidence Act.94 Yet, it also noted 
that “similar fact evidence is always prejudicial … in reality, what is 
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‘similar’ enough [to be admitted] is only so because its prejudicial effect 
has been outweighed by the sheer probity of the similar fact evidence” 
[emphasis in original].95 The problems associated with the balancing test 
have been outlined above.96 What Tan Meng Jee probably meant was that 
a piece of similar fact evidence only has requisite probative value, and is 
therefore relevant, if it corresponds to the specific charge in question. 
Hence, the fact that a person has the habit of shooting at people 
generally albeit with intent to kill is irrelevant if he is being  
tried for the murder of a specific person, whereas the fact that he has 
previously tried to shoot that same specific person is relevant.97 No need 
arises to balance any prejudice and indeed, it is illogical to balance since 
similar fact evidence is inherently always prejudicial. Thus, if relevance 
and reliability are accepted as the touchstones for admissibility, all the 
court needs to consider is the similarity of the evidence to the charge. 
Only evidence with “sheer probative value” would be relevant.98 Reliability 
then becomes a relevant consideration if there is good reason to 
question the veracity of the similar fact evidence – for instance, where 
the evidence provided dates back a significantly long time. 
21 Third, the proposed approach will remove any lingering 
uneasiness over potential double standards between illegally obtained 
evidence and other types of evidence such as improperly recorded 
accused’s statements. In Phyllis, the court held that: (a) there is no 
discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence on the basis of 
unfairness; (b) illegally obtained evidence that is more prejudicial than 
probative may nevertheless be excluded; and (c) the probative value of 
evidence obtained illegally by entrapment must, however, by definition, 
“be greater than its prejudicial value in proving the guilt of the 
accused”.99 In short, the court was essentially saying that all illegally 
obtained evidence would be of such high probative value that it would 
inevitably weigh more than any prejudicial effect and thus be admissible. 
The court has no discretion to exclude it.100 This confusion may be 
eradicated by regarding illegally obtained evidence as a special class of 
evidence that is typically so overwhelmingly probative of guilt that if 
there is no procedural irregularity, the court will ordinarily arrive at a 
conviction. It is in this sense that there can be no prejudice in the form 
of attaching undeserved weight to the evidence arising from the 
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence that outweighs its probative 
value. 
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22 However, carving out a special class for illegally obtained 
evidence to reconcile Phyllis only accentuates the shortcomings of the 
balancing test. If the cumbersome test is replaced by an inquiry into 
reliability, the approach in Phyllis that all illegally obtained evidence is 
admissible will easily be explainable on the basis that by definition, such 
evidence is relevant and since the manner the evidence was obtained 
does not affect the reliability of the evidence which points towards guilt, 
such evidence satisfies the two touchstones of admissibility and must be 
admitted. There is no need to engage in semantical niceties or mental 
gymnastics to deny that there is no prejudice to the accused or to the 
fairness of his trial, as the House of Lords in R v Khan (Sultan) did.101 
There, the accused was convicted based on a conversation he had with 
another person that was secretly recorded by the police. It was held that 
the evidence so obtained did not render the trial sufficiently unfair. 
While it is plausible to argue that illegally obtaining evidence does not 
affect the fairness of the trial, it is not entirely convincing. Lord Nolan 
himself conceded that he “reached this conclusion not only quite firmly 
as a matter of law, but also with relief”.102 It would have been more 
palatable if the court upheld the conviction on the basis that the 
recording itself, notwithstanding any illegality in the process of obtaining 
that admission, was relevant towards proving guilt and reliable in so far 
as the fact that it was secretly made did not impair the veracity of the 
admission. 
23 The upshot of the proposed approach then is that it will be 
quite meaningless (and indeed, inaccurate) to speak of a judicial 
discretion to exclude evidence (whether using the balancing test or 
otherwise). Under the proposed approach, a piece of evidence in 
criminal proceedings is either admissible or inadmissible, based on the 
dual touchstones of relevance and reliability. It is unnecessary and 
unhelpful (and arguably inconsistent with the Evidence Act103) to 
introduce an extra dimension of discretion or excludability.104 This may 
seem like a radical development at first blush but is in fact not so. 
Although the court in Kadar105 invoked the exclusionary discretion 
doctrine vis-à-vis Ismil’s statements, this discretion is arguably not an 
exercise of “discretion” as conventionally understood. It is more apt to 
describe the exclusionary discretion as the power to exclude evidence 
which is relevant but yet at the same time has more prejudicial effect 
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than probative value. The nature of this power is such that whenever the 
balancing test points to net prejudicial effect, the court will invariably 
exclude the otherwise admissible evidence. Thus, it is argued that such a 
power or rule is not a true discretionary power in so far as the exercise 
of the “discretion” to exclude is predetermined by the outcome of the 
balancing test; there is no judicial choice, so to speak. Returning to the 
proposed approach, should a court be unsure as to the precise reliability 
of a piece of evidence, it can always admit the evidence first and 
subsequently attach less weight to it if necessary. Attributing various 
levels of weight to a piece of evidence is yet another mechanism to  
fine-tune doubts over the reliability and veracity of the evidence. It is 
certainly a wieldier, and truly discretionary tool for the judge than the 
balancing test. Indeed, there is much to commend about the judicial and 
judicious attribution of weight to evidence:106 
[T]he balancing test must be considered a close relative of another 
generalised approach that has emerged from judicial practice – that of 
admitting all evidence at the outset, and according different weight or 
no weight at all to the different pieces of evidence thereafter. This 
approach makes sense … because the court may want to take into 
account as many facts as possible to be apprised of the full picture … 
in Singapore’s system where there is only judge and no jury, there is 
not much point in worrying that evidence is prejudicial because it may 
‘taint’ the judge’s judgment in some way – the judge will already have 
considered the evidence … that Singapore has no jury system has  
also led the former Attorney-General, now current Chief Justice, to 
comment at one point that the balancing test ‘should have little or no 
relevance in bench trials as the judge can simply give whatever weight 
is appropriate to the evidence.’ 
24 Fourth, the proposed approach would in effect remove the need 
for a distinct test that applies to (all) the (so-called) exclusionary rules, 
because reliability is capable of being a basis for the exclusionary rules as 
well as a test in and of itself.107 The question that the fact-finder seeks to 
answer in every case is simply “is the evidence relevant, and if so, is it 
reliable?” Inevitably, whether a piece of evidence is reliable depends on 
the facts of the case. Taking procedurally irregular statements as an 
example, it is impossible to fashion blanket and iron-clad rules about 
what kind of police conduct is so flagrant that would immediately 
render evidence obtained unreliable.108 In each case, it is not a question 
of the quantity or quality of irregularities, but whether the irregularities 
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“materially affect” the reliability of the statement.109 This is largely  
an application of logic and good common sense. As the precedents 
show, there is no demonstrable difficulty in determining whether  
the reliability of statements has been materially affected. In Vasavan 
Sathiadew v PP110 and PP v Mazlan bin Maidun,111 for example, the 
failure to obtain a signature in, and the failure to inform the maker of  
a statement of his right against self-incrimination when making a 
cautioned statement respectively evidently did not undermine the 
reliability of the content of the statements made.112 On the flipside, 
where the police officer recorded the accused’s statement on a note and 
did not read the statement back to the accused or obtain his signature, 
and later rewrote an expanded version of the statement and destroyed 
the original note, the reliability of the expanded statement was clearly 
suspect and the judge was right to exclude the statement.113 Similarly, the 
aggregation of the lapses vis-à-vis Ismil’s statements in Kadar 
undoubtedly cast serious doubts as to the reliability of the statements. 
Indubitably, there will be highly controversial scenarios which do not 
yield easy answers. That is where attribution of weight becomes helpful. 
However, that only occurs after the evidence is deemed admissible, and 
admitted. When in doubt as to the reliability of the evidence, the court 
can always admit it first and attribute lesser weight to the evidence. Such 
a practice is not radical. At any rate, in comparison to the convoluted 
and conceptually unsound balancing test, the intuitiveness of reliability 
as both the test and basis for exclusionary rules (not exclusionary 
discretion) is far simpler and more attractive. Determining whether  
a particular piece of evidence is reliable need not entail a rigorous 
arithmetic assessment of the probability of its truth value. The objective 
is simply to determine if the evidence is sufficiently reliable (and, of 
course, relevant). 
III. Conclusion 
25 To recapitulate, in Kadar,114 a piece of evidence is admissible if it 
is material/relevant. However, the court retains a residuary discretion to 
exclude this evidence if it is deemed that its prejudicial effect outweighs 
its probative value. The proposed approach, on the other hand, is that a 
piece of evidence is admissible only if it passes the twin touchstones of 
relevance and reliability. Where in doubt, less weight can be attached to 
the evidence in question, after all the admitted evidence have been 
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considered by the fact-finder as a whole. Judicial discretion to exclude 
evidence does not feature. The advantages of adopting the proposed 
approach, the difficulties with keeping the balancing test, and the 
unnecessary invocation of the exclusionary discretion doctrine in Kadar 
have been set out. Indeed, it is believed that the judicial adoption of the 
proposed approach will achieve some mileage in dispelling the perennial 
confusion that has plagued Evidence Law in Singapore,115 as well as 
achieve parity between the CPC 2010,116 the Evidence Act117 and case 
law.118 
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